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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
Nos. 18-2290 & 18-3436 
______________ 
 
NAUTILUS INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
MOTEL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., 
d/b/a Neshaminy Inn; E. B. 
 
 
MOTEL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-04491) 
District Judge: Hon. Timothy J. Savage  
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 24, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 22, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
At issue in this appeal is whether Nautilus Insurance Company has a duty to 
defend and indemnify Motel Management Services (“MMS”) in a lawsuit minor E.B. 
brought in state court against MMS alleging that MMS failed to intervene or report that 
traffickers enticed E.B. to engage in commercial sex acts at MMS’s motel.  Because the 
Court properly determined that the assault and battery exclusion in MMS’s insurance 
policy applies, and therefore Nautilus does not have a duty to defend MMS in E.B.’s suit, 
we will affirm the orders granting Nautilus’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and 
denying MMS’s motion for relief from that judgment.  
I 
E.B., a minor female, sued MMS and other motel operators in Pennsylvania state 
court (“the underlying action”), alleging that (1) she “was recruited, enticed, solicited, 
harbored and/or transported to engage in commercial sex acts” in violation of 
Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3011, including at a motel 
owned and operated by MMS, App. 31 ¶ 27;1 (2) she was “held at gun point and 
threatened to engage in sexual acts with multiple traffickers,” App. 33 ¶ 37, “visibly 
treated in an aggressive manner” by those engaging in commercial sex acts with her, 
App. 33 ¶ 41, and suffered physical harm; (3) MMS facilitated her exploitation by 
knowingly renting rooms at its motel to the traffickers; (4) MMS failed to intervene or to 
report the traffickers’ illegal conduct; and (5) MMS financially profited from E.B.’s 
                                              
1 Appendix citations are to the appendix filed in docket number 18-2290.  
3 
exploitation.  E.B. sought compensatory and punitive damages for negligence per se,2 
negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.   
Nautilus brought this declaratory judgment action asserting that an exclusion in 
MMS’s insurance policy with Nautilus for claims arising out of an assault or battery, 
including a failure to prevent or suppress an assault or battery, exempted it from the 
duties to defend and indemnify MMS in E.B.’s suit.   
The District Court granted Nautilus’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
declaring that Nautilus had no duty to defend and indemnify MMS because E.B.’s claims 
in the underlying action arose from facts alleging negligent failure to prevent an assault 
or battery and therefore were not covered by the insurance policy.  Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 
Motel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 636 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  MMS thereafter filed a 
Rule 60(b) motion contending that E.B.’s deposition testimony in the underlying action 
conflicted with the allegations in the Complaint.  The Court denied the motion.  MMS 
appeals both orders.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
2 This claim alleges that MMS’s conduct violated Pennsylvania’s Human 
Trafficking Law.  
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II3 
When interpreting an insurance contract under Pennsylvania law, which all parties 
agree governs this dispute, we must ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as 
manifested in the terms of the policy.  Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 
286, 290 (Pa. 2007).  Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must follow it.  
Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 861 (Pa. 2004).  However, where the 
contract language is ambiguous, we construe that provision in favor of the insured.  Id.   
An insurer has a duty to defend the insured in any suit in which the complaint 
alleges potentially covered injuries.  Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91.  If an insurer 
relies on a policy exclusion as an affirmative defense to deny coverage, it bears the 
burden of proving that the exclusion applies.  Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. 
Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999).  In determining whether Nautilus has a duty to 
defend MMS, “we may not look . . . beyond the four corners of [E.B.’s] complaint and 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review a denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
de novo.”  Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017).  In considering a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, we must accept as true all facts presented in the 
complaint and answer, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party—here, MMS.  See Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express Inc., 914 F.3d 812, 816 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2019).  “Judgment will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes there are 
no material issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  While MMS implores us to look beyond the 
pleadings, we may not.  
“We review the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion.”  Coltec 
Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under Rule 60(b), “the court 
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding” in light of “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could 
not have been discovered” before the judgment was entered.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).  
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how it matches up with the actual terms of the . . . Policy.”  Lupu v. Loan City, LLC, 903 
F.3d 382, 392 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 896 (Pa. 2006)).  Pennsylvania law does not 
recognize any exceptions to this “four corners” rule, even if the insurer knows or should 
know that the allegations in the complaint are untrue.  Id. at 390-92.  
Here, Nautilus asserts that its policy excludes from coverage claims “arising out 
of” an assault or battery.  The exclusion provides that Nautilus “will have no duty to 
defend or indemnify any insured in any action or proceeding alleging damages arising out 
of any assault or battery,” regardless of culpability, intent, or relationship of the 
perpetrator of the assault or battery to the insured, or whether the damages occurred at 
premises owned or operated by the insured.  App. 111.  The assault and battery exclusion 
specifically omits from the policy’s coverage “[a]ll causes of action arising out of any 
assault or battery” or “any act, error, or omission relating to such an assault or battery.”  
App. 111.   
The term “arising out of” is interpreted in terms of “but for” causation.  See 
Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 109-10 (citing McCabe v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 228 A.2d 
901, 903 (Pa. 1967)).  Therefore, if an assault or battery was a “but for” cause of the 
plaintiff’s injuries, the assault and battery exclusion will apply to allegations that the 
insured’s negligence contributed to the injuries.  See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Seybert, 757 
A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding no duty to defend where insured bar’s 
negligence in serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated men who subsequently attacked 
plaintiff in underlying action was merely a contributing factor and not a direct cause of 
6 
plaintiff’s injuries).  The insurer only owes a duty to defend if the complaint alleges the 
insured’s negligence directly led to the injuries.  See QBE Ins. Corp. v. M & S Landis 
Corp., 915 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding duty to defend nightclub that 
negligently trained staff who restrained a patron because the negligence of the nightclub 
and its staff directly caused plaintiff’s injuries). 
All alleged injuries in this complaint are the result of exploitation and assault by 
traffickers and customers with whom E.B. engaged in commercial sex acts.4  
Accordingly, the assault and battery were the “but for” causes of the injuries E.B. claims.  
E.B. nowhere alleges that MMS’s negligence directly caused her injuries or caused an 
independent harm.  Rather, she alleges that MMS failed to intervene or report the 
traffickers’ activities and MMS they financially benefitted from her abuse.  The assault 
and battery exclusion, however, encompasses claims arising both from an assault or 
                                              
4 MMS argues that the assault and battery exclusion should not apply because 
involuntary servitude under Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law does not 
“necessarily include[] assault.”  Appellant’s Br. at 15.  However, our focus is on the four 
corners of E.B.’s complaint, in which she alleges that she suffered injury including 
physical harm and mental anguish as a victim of human trafficking, including by being 
“visibly treated in an aggressive manner” and “held at gun point” and forced to engage in 
commercial sex acts.  App. 33.  These allegations reflect assaults and batteries, and it is 
irrelevant for the purposes of deciding insurance coverage whether they also satisfy the 
elements of Pennsylvania’s Human Trafficking Law.  See Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. v. Haver, 
725 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1999) (“[T]he particular cause of action that a complainant pleads 
is not determinative of whether coverage has been triggered. Instead it is necessary to 
look at the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”). 
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battery and from a failure to prevent or suppress an assault or battery.  This language 
unambiguously bars coverage for E.B.’s claims.5   
Accordingly, the District Court did not err by holding that Nautilus has no duty to 
defend or indemnify MMS.6  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
                                              
5 Because the insurance policy excludes coverage, we need not address whether 
public policy would also preclude insurance coverage for the criminal conduct and 
intentional torts alleged in E.B.’s complaint.  
6 Because Pennsylvania adheres to a strict “four corners” rule, Lupu, 903 F.3d at 
390-92 (citing Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896), the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying MMS’s Rule 60(b)(2) motion and declining to consider E.B.’s deposition in 
the underlying action to determine whether Nautilus is obligated to defend MMS.  
